The Lemon test, while it has been criticized and modified through the years, remains the main test used by lower courts in establishment clause cases, such as those involving government aid to parochial schools or the introduction of religious observances into the public sector. Under the three-part test, the court would examine the proposed aid to the religious entity and ensure that it had a clear secular purpose. The Court also would determine if the primary effect of the aid would advance or inhibit religion. For the third prong, the Court would examine whether the aid would create an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. (Photo of Catholic School students on the White House lawn in 2006, public domain).
The Supreme Court often uses the three-pronged Lemon test when it evaluates whether a law or governmental activity violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Establishment of religion cases tend to involve government aid to religion, such as aid to parochial schools, or the introduction of religious observances into the public sector, such as school prayer. The Court measures the aid or program against the prongs of the test.
Lemon test comes from Lemon v. Kurtzman
The Lemon test, considered aptly named by its critics, derives its name from the landmark decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). Lemon represented the refinement of a test the Supreme Court announced in Walz v. Tax Commission (1970).
Writing for the majority in Walz, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger took the traditional purpose and effect test the Court had been using since Everson v. Board of Education (1947) and added the excessive government entanglement prong to the test.
Under these guidelines, the Court would examine the proposed aid to the religious entity and ensure that it had a clear secular purpose. The Court also would determine if the primary effect of the aid would advance or inhibit religion. For the third prong, added in the Walz case, the Court would examine whether the aid would create an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.
Burger attempted to clarify 'excessive governmental entanglement'
In Lemon v. Kurtzman Burger, again writing for the unanimous Court, attempted to clarify some of the confusion regarding the meaning of the excessive governmental entanglement prong of the test. To determine whether the program created an impermissible entanglement between religion and government, there were three factors the Court had to weigh. The Court would look at the character and purpose of the institution that benefited, the nature of the aid the state was providing, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious institution. If the program failed any single part of the test, it would render the aid an unconstitutional violation of the establishment clause.
The Court expressed concern regarding the question of political division. According to Burger, the “potential for political divisiveness” of religious programs was “a principal evil” the First Amendment was designed to prevent.
In applying the test to various programs under review, the Court generally concedes the first prong, refusing to second guess the legislature’s purpose. Only a handful of programs fail to meet the “effect” part of the test. The key provision of the test normally lies in the excessive governmental entanglement prong.
Appplication of the test is inconsistent
If, as is believed, Burger intended this to be a relatively accommodationist test, he would be disappointed. For about two decades, the test generally was used by the Court to erect a wall of separation between church and state.
Ultimately, excessive entanglement is in the eye of the beholder. Justices who favor separation can use the test to find a violation of the establishment clause, whereas supporters of accommodation could use the same test to uphold the practice or program in question. Indeed, critics of the Court’s jurisprudence have argued that application has exhibited a great deal of inconsistency, which filters to the legislatures that pass such programs and the lower courts that have to evaluate them.
Lemon test has faced criticism
Both justices and legal analysts have attacked the Lemon test. As the Court became more conservative, the move to accommodation gained momentum. In Lee v. Weisman (1992), the Court considered whether a nondenominational prayer could be offered at a high school graduation ceremony. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued for a non-preferentialism test, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor advocated a religious endorsement test, and Justice Antonin Scalia continued to advance a noncoercive test; however, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who wrote the opinion in Lee, joined those who supported the preservation of the Lemon test. Many analysts had predicted the demise of Lemon.
In the 1993 decision Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, Scalia famously observed that “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again.” In Agostini v. Felton (1997), the Court modified the Lemon test by folding the entanglement prong into the primary effects prong.
The repeated criticisms, modifications, and failure to apply the Lemon test in some establishment cases, in addition to other tests used by the justices in the establishment clause area, have largely undermined its effectiveness. In upholding the right of a football coach of a public school to offer after-game prayers at mid-field in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), Justice Neil Gorsuch (whose opinion was joined by five other justices) argued that the court had long abandoned the Lemon test, which he criticized as being too abstract and ahistorical, for an approach that emphasized “reference to historical practices and understandings.” Three dissenting justices, led by Justice Sotomayor, believed that the three-part Lemon test was still useful.
This article was originally written in 2009. Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. is professor and department head in Political Science at the University of Tennessee. Pacelle’s primary research focus is the Supreme Court. His research includes concerns with policy evolution particularly regarding the First Amendment and the role of policy entrepreneurs in the judiciary, Supreme Court agenda building and decision-making, and inter-branch relations.Send Feedback on this article